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Abstract
This paper uses principal-agent and transaction cost theories to analyze the
concept of control in multinational enterprises. One of the main points is the
distinction between methods of organization (the price system and hierarchy)
and economic institutions (markets and firms), which use both methods of
organization. I argue that the price system and hierarchy are substitutes,
with the price system utilized in firms to overcome the basic flaws of
hierarchy. This theoretical framework is then used to analyze some of the
relationships studied in the organization theory literature of the MNE.

1. Introduction
How do firms manage to efficiently perform their functions? How do they
constrain individual behavior to make it compatible with the overall goals of
the firm? This question has been of particular interest to students of the
multinational enterprise (MNE) (see for example Brooke and Remmers, 1970;
Pralahad and Doz, 1981; Doz and Pralahad, 1981; Hedlund, 1981, 1986; Welge,
1987; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Egelhoff, 1988; Gates and Egelhoff, 1986;
Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett and Goshal, 1989). This is because the problem of
control is particularly acute in MNEs. Geographical and cultural distance
increase the cost of establishing control, and many MNEs have found it
difficult to obtain the cooperation of their foreign affiliates. Over-
centralization of decisions leads to paralysis, while excessive
decentralization results in chaos (Doz and Pralahad, 1981).
The issue of control in MNEs has elicited a considerable volume of
empirical research. A recent survey of coordination mechanisms in MNEs lists
85 empirical studies undertaken since 1953 (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989). Yet,
in spite of this significant effort, our knowledge of control mechanisms in
firms is still fragmentary. For example, on one of the most salient issues,
that of the determinants of centralization (the extent to which decisions are
taken at the headquarters of the MNE), "researchers have generated
inconsistent hypotheses... and reported inconsistent results" (Gates and
Egelhoff, 1986, p. 72).
The goal of this paper is threefold. First, I intend to sketch a
theoretical structure to clarify some of the concepts used in the study of
coordination mechanisms in firms. One of the main building blocks of this
framework is the distinction between methods of organization (the price system
and hierarchy) and economic institutions (markets and firms) which use both of
these methods. Another is the argument that price systems and hierarchy use
different methods of organization which are substitutes. Hence the price
system can be used in firms to overcome the basic flaws of hierarchy, and vice
versa. This theoretical framework will then be used to analyze some of the
relationships studied in the organization theory literature of the MNE, for
example that between the degree of centralization and the extent of
interdependencies between the parent and its foreign affiliates. I will show
how the framework developed here explains some of the paradoxical results
found in previous studies. Lastly, I will suggest some directions for further
research.
The model presented below, based on Hennart (1982), draws from both
transaction cost and agency theory, but differs to some extent from both. It
posits that organizations are designed to minimize the cost of organizing
exchange and cooperation, and that competition in the product and factor
markets leads individuals to organize themselves under the form of
organization that minimizes these costs.
2. A Theory of Economic Organization
The major insight of transaction cost theory is that firms and markets
are alternative institutions devised to organize economic activities. To
understand the nature of organizational processes within firms one must ask
two separate questions: First, what must be done to organize economic
activities, that is, what are the tasks that both firms and markets must
perform? Second, how do firms differ from markets in the way they perform
these tasks?
2.1 What is involved in organizing economic activities?
Economic institutions (such as firms and markets) exist to organize
cooperation. Cooperation between economic individuals can be productive for
two reasons. First, some tasks require more capabilities than can be provided
by a single individual, and consequently can only be achieved by pooling the
efforts of more than one person. Individuals have also differing abilities,
and trade allows individuals to exploit those differences by making it
possible for each to specialize in tasks for which they have a comparative
advantage. In both cases the utility that individuals receive from cooperating
is greater than what they could achieve through their solitary effort.
Although cooperation is productive, achieving it is not costless: first,
individuals must be told that their interaction will be profitable; second,
their effort to extract all of the gains from cooperation must be curbed (some
sharing rule must be imposed on them); thirdly, the sharing rules must be
enforced. Failing this, cooperation would not take place or would not last.
For example, if there is no sharing rule which imposes itself on cooperators,
they can be expected to bargain to increase their share. In the process, they
may invest more resources in bargaining than would be available if they
cooperated. Achieving cooperation requires therefore carefully devised
techniques that reduce information, bargaining, and enforcement costs. These
costs (which we call "organizing costs") arise from man's "bounded
rationality" and from his "opportunism", i.e. his self-seeking behavior.
Neoclassical economics assumes that the three tasks that must be
performed to obtain cooperation are performed costlessly in firms as well as
in markets. What economists call "the theory of the firm" starts by assuming
that this problem is solved (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). In reality, all
economic institutions experience costs in performing these three tasks. At any
point in time, some potential gains of cooperation will be foregone because
the gains from such cooperation are too small to warrant the establishment of
institutions to organize it. Individuals will have to give up the gains of
trade and specialization, and we will observe subsistence farming, self-
insurance, and home production of clothing and food. The greater the potential
gains from trade, the larger the amount of resources expended to achieve
cooperation.
2.2 Prices and Hierarchy are Two Alternative Methods of Organization
It is important at the outset to distinguish between "method of
organization" and "economic institution". The price system and hierarchy are
alternative methods that can be used to organize economic activities. They are
alternative in the sense that they use different methods of organization,
which result in different biases. Consequently, they experience, for a given
interaction (transaction), different levels of organizing costs. Each mode
will therefore have a comparative advantage in organizing a particular set of
transactions. 1 Firms and markets are economic institutions. These institutions
generally use a mix of both methods of organization, although the mix in firms
is heavily biased towards hierarchy, while markets predominantly use the price
system. As we will show, the choice between organizing a transaction within
the firm or having it organized through the market (the make-or-buy decision)
is a choice between using the price system and using hierarchy. The same
analysis can be used to decide whether to organize an activity within a firm
through prices or through hierarchy.
Let us first consider how the price system and hierarchy are viable ways
of organizing cooperation. To simplify the exposition, it is assumed that
there are zero transaction costs. This makes it possible to distinguish
between the method of organization used and the actual performance of these
methods of organization when organizing costs are positive.
We have seen that the organizing exchange and cooperation requires that
individuals be informed of their interdependence, rewarded for cooperating,
and discouraged from bargaining. Prices can perform these three tasks. Prices
inform individuals about opportunities for cooperation. The information
structure of a market is fully decentralized, with each party receiving
through prices information on every one else's needs and desires, and adapting
to it in a way that maximizes social (and individual) utility. 2 Prices also
act as sharing rules that allocate the gains from cooperation. When markets
function perfectly (i.e. when there is a large number of buyers and sellers),
these sharing rules become exogenous. Individuals do not have the power to
change them, and bargaining is discouraged. Prices also meter and reward
perfectly an agent's behavior. The gross rewards that individuals receive is
directly function of their output times market prices.
In the absence of organizing costs, another method of organization, which
we call hierarchy, would also perfectly organize economic activities. We
define hierarchy as a method of organization, and hence "hierarchy" is not
synonymous with "firm" nor with "upper managers". Hierarchy is defined here as
a method of organization that is characterized by centralized information and
the use of behavior constraints. Hence our definition of hierarchy differs
significantly from its current usage (as in Hedlund's piece in this volume).
While information is decentralized with prices, it is centralized with
hierarchy. The hierarchical method of organization channels all the
information possessed by individuals (employees) to a central party, the boss,
who assimilates all of the information dispersed in the system, draws
consistent plans, and retransmits it to employees in the form of directives.
If individuals have "unbounded rationality", this is as efficient a method of
making optimal joint decisions as the decentralized system of market prices.
A price system has individuals collect their own information and make
their own productive decisions, and they are rewarded by their output measured
at market prices. By contrast, under hierarchy the agent relinquishes to a
central party, the boss, his right to make decisions concerning the allocation
of his own resources (such as his labor-time and effort), and instead agrees
to do as told, within the constraints established by social custom. Why do
employees agree to have their behavior directed by the boss? Because their
reward under hierarchy is independent of their output. They are therefore less
concerned about being ordered to perform tasks that do not seem to maximize
their income. A hierarchical system does not reward employees by their output
measured at market prices, but by their obedience to managerial directives. In
other words, firms use behavior constraints: employees are paid a fixed amount
for following orders. Employees will be less concerned about the allocation of
their resources, for they will not bear the monetary consequences of such
allocation. In the absence of organizing costs, direction of tasks will then
be easily performed by fiat.
2.3 Markets and firms in the presence of positive organizing costs
In the real world, both the price system and hierarchy will experience
costs in organizing economic activities. But because these two methods are
fundamentally different, they will experience different levels of organizing
costs for a given transaction.
A real-life price system experiences costs in informing parties, in
curbing bargaining, and in enforcing sharing rules. These costs have been
called (market) transaction costs. Let us first consider the costs incurred by
a price system in informing parties, before turning to those involved in
enforcing the terms of transactions.
Information
The price system works by communicating information to all interacting
parties. That information must by necessity be compact, for otherwise the
information needs of the system would be overwhelming. In a society consisting
of n independent parties, organizing activities through prices requires
l/2(n2-n) two-way communication channels, as every individual must communicate
with all others. By contrast, only n two-way channels are required in a
hierarchy, where all messages are channelled through a central party
(Williamson, 1970, p. 20). Whenever price information has to be supplemented
by complex descriptions, transferring exhaustive information to all parties
would be exceedingly costly. As Arrow (1974) point out, prices are
concentrated information: in one number is expressed all that is needed for
parties to adapt. But this presupposes that the characteristics of the goods
are known to all. Knowing that grade A butter is 4 dollars a pound or that
virgin aluminium grade P1020A is 65 cents a pound is useful to guide behavior;
knowing that cars are 50 cents a pound or that master paintings are 5 $ the
square inch is not. This is because the latter two goods have an infinite
variety of attributes. With bounded rationality, individuals will not have a
perfect knowledge of the characteristics of goods transacted. Prices will no
longer perfectly describe goods in all of their dimensions. In some cases,
they will provide "wrong" signals that will mislead economic individuals,
leading them to overconsume (underproduce) underpriced goods and underconsume
(overproduce) overpriced ones.
When prices fail to act as efficient guides to behavior, a decentralized
system may be efficiently replaced by a centralized one. A decentralized
system requires individuals to gather all of the information they need. If the
compact information provided by prices needs to be supplemented by extensive
additional information, then centralizing information is efficient. It may be
desirable to specialize each individual in the collection of a limited type of
information, and to ask him to transfer the information to a central party.
The central party can then synthesize that information, make decisions, and
send directives for execution. This is the essence of the hierarchical
solution.
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The benefits of hierarchy are especially noticeable when the environment
is changing rapidly. The hierarchical method of organization concentrates all
information and decision-making in a top coordinator. Decisions concerning
what is to be done can be imposed by fiat, because the allocation of tasks has
little impact on an employee's income (which is independent of output). The
price system, on the other hand, rewards parties in proportion to their
output. When the price system works perfectly, prices are exogenous and
bargaining is impossible. In conditions of imperfect competition, prices are
no longer exogenous, and parties to the exchange will resist changes
detrimental to their interest unless they are fully compensated. The time
spent communicating the information to all concerned parties and resolving
disputes may be such as to make adjustment impossible: by the time an
agreement is reached, further adjustment may be needed. Hierarchy in more
efficient in this respect, as the central coordinator can quickly respecify
the system through fiat (Williamson, 1975).
There are, however, two major problems with the hierarchical solution.
First, information collection and decision-making are now dissociated.
Individuals often acquire idiosyncratic information in the course of their
activities. In a price system, they can be expected to use this information to
increase their income (Hayek, 1945, p. 521). Under a hierarchical one,
employees have less incentive to become informed and to transmit such
information because they will not be directly rewarded for doing so. Even if
employees faithfully transmit upwards everything that they observe,
information will be lost as it is transferred across hierarchical levels. The
11
information loss may be voluntary or involuntary. Involuntary distortion
results from encoding/decoding gaps (Williamson 1970). Distortion may also be
voluntary because employees can be expected to distort information in ways
that benefit them. The greater the size of the firm and hence, for a given
span of control, the greater the number of hierarchical levels, the higher the
information losses incurred by hierarchy.
Enforcement
Prices will provide appropriate signals to guide behavior if they reflect
the social value of goods and services. In reality, bounded rationality will
make measurement costs positive. Because of diminishing returns to measurement
activity, it will not pay to measure outputs perfectly. Traders will incur
enforcement costs up to the point where the marginal cost of enforcement is
equal to the marginal gain from better measurement. Consequently, it will be
possible for market participants to alter the terms of trade to their
advantage within that range without a corresponding loss of revenues. In other
word, the high costs of measurement will make it possible for individuals to
cheat. Individuals will supply too little of what is desired and too much of
what is not. Hence the costs of a price system (from the point of view of the
reward function) will be the cost of measuring output plus the cost of
cheating that will result from imperfect measurement. We call these "cheating"
costs.
One way to reduce cheating is to reduce the incentive that the seller has
to cheat, i.e to make his income (i.e his output times market prices)
independent of his behavior. As we have seen above, this is the essence of the
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hierarchical solution. This solution, however, has the unavoidable consequence
of reducing the employee's incentive to apply his initiative and effort (at
least as long as effort enters his utility function with a negative sign)
.
The point is best made with an example. Consider a farmer that contracts
for a fixed price to have fertilizer spread on his field. One important
dimension of performance is the uniformity of application. If the fertilizer
has not been uniformly applied, the crop in parts of the field may suffer
burns, while in others it may fail to grow. One way to protect against this
eventuality would be to carefully measure performance. In this instance, the
farmer could sample parts of the field after application and calculate the
weight of fertilizer per square yard. This, however, is likely to be very
costly as the fertilizer may quickly dissolve into the ground. Since an even
application of fertilizer takes more time and effort than an uneven one, a
subcontractor who is paid a fixed amount for the job will be incited, if
detection is costly, to apply fertilizer in an uneven way. A In this case, the
cost of transacting on the market (from an enforcement point of view) is the
cost of measuring performance plus the cost due to cheating (the cost to the
farmer of a reduced crop due to uneven application).
Where, as in the case above, the cost of measuring output and the
consequences of imperfectly doing it are substantial, it may be cheaper for
both parties to use a different method of organization, hierarchy. Rather than
expend resources to measure output, it may be desirable to change the behavior
of individuals by reducing the incentives they have to cheat. This can be done
by breaking the connection between output and rewards. In our case, the farmer
can hire the subcontractor who applies fertilizer and promise him a fixed sum
13
of money per unit of time, on condition that he follows his orders. Now that
his salary is no longer function of his output per unit of time, the farm hand
has less incentive to spread fertilizer unevenly.
One unavoidable consequence of this decoupling is that, while it reduces
cheating, it also reduces incentives to work. A self-employed individual (i.e
an agent constrained by prices) who slacks or decides to take the day off pays
the full cost of his behavior in the form of reduced income. When rewards are
no longer proportional to performance (as measured on the market), employees
will have incentives to shirk, i.e. to break the promises they made to obey
managerial directives. How much shirking will take place will depend on the
extent to which the employee's objectives differ from those of the employer.
For example, with a non-zero disutility of effort, employees will have
incentives to reduce the effort they devote to their tasks. Note that shirking
does not necessarily mean loafing: it can involve doing the work too well.
More generally, employees who shirk will act differently from what they would
do if they were self employed. Bosses will therefore have to expend resources
to direct and monitor behavior. In our example, the farm hand will have less
incentives to exercise effort to get the job done as quickly as possible if he
is paid on a time basis. Because of diminishing returns to monitoring, it will
not be profitable to eliminate shirking completely, and some residual amount
of shirking will remain. "Shirking costs" are the sum of the costs of
monitoring performance and that of bearing the residual amount of shirking.
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2.4. From Method of Organization to Economic Institutions
The argument so far is that prices and hierarchy are two alternative
methods of organizing economic activities. The solutions they provide to the
problem of information, bargaining, and enforcement are radically different.
While hierarchy centralizes information, the price system decentralizes it. A
decentralized information structure avoids the losses due to information
transfer, but it experiences problem of suboptimization if prices do not
provide the "right" information, i.e information that defines the good in all
of its attributes. Hierarchy's solution is to centralize information, but this
reduces the incentives that individuals have to collect information and leads
to information loss.
The problem of rewarding useful behavior is also solved by the price
system in a way that is quite different from that used by hierarchy. The price
system motivates individuals to maximize output, but its efficiency is limited
by the cost of measuring all dimensions of output: individuals can be expected
to underproduce those dimensions of output which use positively priced inputs
if measurement is costly, i.e. they will cheat. Hierarchy solves the problem
of cheating by decoupling reward from (market-measured) output, but this
solution requires control of behavior. Since such control is costly, it will
generally not pay to monitor perfectly, and employees will relax their effort
(they will shirk)
.
Because the price system and hierarchy provide different methods of
organizing economic activities, they tend to experience, for a given
15
transaction, different levels of organizing costs. In our previous example,
measuring the quality of the output (the evenness in the application of
fertilizer) was costlier than specifying and monitoring behavior (how the
fertilizer should be and is applied). In that case, employing a worker to
spread the fertilizer will be chosen over subcontracting that task. Inversely,
the price system will be used when output is relatively easy to measure, but
behavior is difficult to direct and monitor. Such would be the case from home
workers, who toil in dispersed locations and are therefore costly to
supervise.
So far we have described two methods of organization, the price system
and hierarchy. What is the relationship between these methods of organization
and the economic institutions of firms and markets?
A simple answer is that firms are institutions which use hierarchy, while
markets use price signals. In fact, both institutions use a mix of both
methods of organization for reasons shown below. However, the example of
fertilizer application shows that the essence of firms is the employment
relationship, i.e. the imposition of behavior constraints. It is by imposing
behavior constraints (and simultaneously relaxing price constraints) that the
cost of uneven application of fertilizer is reduced. Hence the use of
hierarchy (behavior constraints) is the distinguishing mark of firms. And
empirically the use of pure employment contracts, in which the employee is
rewarded entirely in function of his obedience to managerial directives, is
widespread in firms.
16
Because the level of shirking may, in some activities, grow more than
proportionally as behavior constraints replace price constraints, the firm may
reintroduce price constraints alongside behavior constraints within the
employment relationship. Consider the sales function: the firm can either use
the price system (contract with sales representatives) or use hierarchy (hire
employees paid on a time basis). The choice between those two options depends
on the comparison of two types of cost: sales reps will maximize effort, but
will also fail to supply outputs that are costly to measure, for example
customer service (Anderson and Oliver, 1987). When the latter is important,
firms will use in-house salespersons. Because their salary is now independent
of performance, they are likely to be less energetic in making calls. If the
cost of curbing shirking is very high, paying them in part through commissions
is often a cheaper method of control than hiring additional supervisors to
monitor their behavior (to follow them on their rounds and record how many
sales calls they make). Hence a mix of both modes of organization may be, in
some instances, the least cost way of effecting coordination. Firms generally
use a mix of price and behavior constraints which will vary with the nature of
the tasks involved. What defines the firm is a relatively heavy emphasis on
behavior constraints; markets, on the other hand, are characterized by the
predominant use of price constraints.
3. Control Processes within Firms.
This section describes in more detail the control processes used in
firms. The discussion will focus on the relationship between the employer and
the employee, first at the task level, then at that of the subunit.
3.1 Control of Employees
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In the hierarchical method of organization, the central coordinator (the
boss) tells employees what to do and rewards them in function of their
following orders. Since employees are paid a fixed amount to obey managerial
directives, the information they collect no longer benefits them directly.
They therefore can be expected to be less motivated than self-employed
individuals to gather and to make use of the information that is relevant to
production. This means that a hierarchical system reguires that the employer
have a good knowledge of the employee production function and be able to voice
or draft clear directives to guide his or her behavior. In Ouchi's (1979)
terminology, tasks must be "programmable."
The need for the top coordinator to know the employee's production
function to be able to direct his behavior can be combined with the relative
level of shirking vs. cheating costs to categorize the various types of
control mechanisms used in firms. Table 1, adapted from Ouchi (1979), sum-
marizes the argument. Firms can use three types of control, depending on the
degree to which management has an information advantage over employees, and on
the level of shirking costs relative to cheating costs.
Cells 1 and 2 correspond to behavior control. As argued above, this
method of control is useful when all dimensions of performance cannot be
easily specified ex ante and measured ex post, so that rewards based on
outputs would generate high cheating costs. It may then be cheaper to control
behavior. There are, however, two ways of imposing behavior control. The first
one is the method described so far, hierarchical control (cell 1).
Hierarchical control consists in explicitly telling employees what to do, and
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in observing their behavior to ascertain that they are following orders. This
control can be exerted personally by the boss, or impersonally through
bureaucratic rules and regulations (what Child (1973) has called a "centrali-
zing" and a "bureaucratic" strategy of control). In a fundamental sense, those
two modes of control are similar: they aim at specifying behavior, i.e how
employees must act. Hierarchical control will therefore be used when two
conditions are met: the employer knows well the employee's production
function, and the cost of shirking is less than that of cheating. For example,
machine-paced processes, such as assembly lines, make monitoring easier,
because the productivity of the employee is indicated by his behavior. Using
piece rates on assembly lines would be dysfunctional, as workers would fail to
cooperate, and would abuse the machinery. At the same time, assembly-line
processes make it difficult to separate the productivity of one employee from
that of the others. Firms tend therefore to use hierarchical control for such
processes. The costs of using hierarchical control are likely to rise
dramatically with geographical dispersion, which raises monitoring costs, and
with idiosyncratic tasks, because how to perform these tasks cannot be
specified ex ante.
In some cases, workers have an information advantage over management, and
output is difficult to measure and price in all of its dimensions, a situation
characteristic of "professional" work (cell 2). Efficiency requires that
employees be left free to make production decisions, yet output is difficult
to measure. The solution then consists in having the objectives of the
employee coincide with those of the employer. There are two ways to insure
that this is the case: (1) select workers who have the same goals as
19
management; (2) invest resources in persuading worker who may have different
goals to internalize the employer's values, i.e to act without external
constraint in the employer's best interest (Ouchi, 1981, pp. 414-415). The
first strategy makes direction and monitoring unnecessary, since employees
will do what is needed out of their own self-interest. An example would be to
hire student athletes to do maintenance work (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985).
Firms can also attempt to persuade employees with divergent goals that "what
they want to do is the same as what they have to do" (Kanter, 1972, p. 1; see
also Van Maanen, 1975). If the firm is successful, employees will voluntarily
choose not to shirk. This method, which Ouchi, following Durkheim (1933),
calls "clan", and Baliga and Jeager (1984) call "cultural control", economizes
on information and monitoring costs. Socialized employees need not be
monitored, and they do not have to be given specific answers to specific
problems: they only need to be told the goals or philosophy of the
organization. They can deduce from it the rule appropriate for any situation
(Ouchi, 1981, p. 421). Hence the system is much more flexible than
hierarchical control. Because employees now espouse management's goals, few
resources need be invested to measure performance nor to monitor behavior.
Rewards can be tied to the dedication of the individual to the group and to
his or her length of service, a behavior that facilitates socialization.
These two methods are often combined, and they involve very substantial
up-front costs. Compared to hierarchical or price control, more resources must
be devoted to selection, to training, to communication, and to social
interactions, so as to impart the philosophy of the firm to the new recruits.
Socialization strategies are therefore cheaper to implement if the society
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from which employees are recruited is already culturally homogenous.
Investment in selection and socialization will only pay off if the firm can
guarantee that the individual will have a long tenure with the organization.
But probably the biggest limit to socialization is that it tends to create an
inbred group of managers, intolerant of differences, and unreceptive to
outside ideas, a phenomenon known as "groupthink" (Janis, 1972). Creative
types do not do well in socialized organizations, as shown, for example, by
the difficulties experienced by IBM in developing in-house software (Depke,
1989).
In cells 1 and 2, the control exercised by the employer is behavior
control: explicit in the case of hierarchical control, implicit and internal-
ized in the case of socialization. The third type of control (cell 3) is
output-based, in the sense that the reward of the agent is a direct function
of his output, but not of the way he has achieved it. We call it price
control. This mode of control is efficient when the employee's knowledge of
his production function is better than that of management's and the
performance of the worker is easily measurable in all of its dimensions. In
that case, directing the behavior of the employee and rewarding him for
following orders would be inefficient, since the worker knows better than the
boss how to achieve management's goals. It is better to let him free to behave
as he deems appropriate, and to selectively reintroduce a market mechanism to
control shirking by establishing a link between rewards and outputs. This form
of control takes the form of piece work and commissions.
The benefit of using price controls within firms is that, given positive
monitoring costs, they elicit greater effort. 8 They also harness the capabili-
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ties and the knowledge of the employee, and make control possible without the
need for management to know the production process and to closely monitor
employees. Output-based rewards thus save on managerial capabilities. The
costs of such system is that, unless all dimensions of performance are
measured and priced (or constrained), maximization of effort will also lead to
g
maximization of unwanted side-effects. For example, paying piece rates for
"picking" crabs (i.e. for extracting crabmeat from crabs) will incite workers
to extract only the back meat, which is easier to take out, and to leave claw-
meat in the shells. This tendency can be (and is) easily checked by weighing
the picked shells, and comparing their weight to the weight of the crabmeat.
The ability to control such behavior makes it possible to use piece rates. On
the other hand, application of fertilizers on fields is done on a time-wage
basis (i.e hierarchical control), because it is difficult to determine whether
or not the chemicals have been uniformly applied, and because the consequences'
of uneven concentration can be substantial (Roumasset and Uy, 1980).
Note that the relative cost of using each form of control will vary
across transactions within a given firm. Employees in some departments of a
store may be paid through commissions, while others receive a straight salary.
3.2 Control of Subunits
The same analysis can be used to explain the pattern of control at the
level of the firm's subunits (subsidiaries) (Table 2). If the performance of
the subsidiary is difficult to measure, and headquarters (HQ) knows better
than the subsidiary what has to be done, then it will resort to hierarchical
control (cell 1). Decisions will be taken by HQ and the subsidiary will be
22
told what to do. If HQ goals can be internalized by the management of the
subsidiary, then control can be achieved through socialization. Lastly,
control can be achieved through prices, by setting up the subsidiary as a
profit center. By choosing appropriate internal transfer prices, the firm can
elicit the same behavior than it would obtain through behavior control. If
output is measurable, and HQ has less knowledge than the subsidiary manager on
how to achieve the desired outcome, then letting subunit managers free to
maximize the subsidiary's results, and rewarding them in function of those
results, will achieve better results than specifically directing their
behavior with directives from HQ, as local managers will be incited to make
use of their specialized knowledge for the benefit of the firm. Establishing
the affiliate as a profit center has also informational advantages, since it
relieves HQ from having to learn how to operate locally, and it economizes on
the amount of information that has to be sent and received from affiliates.
Instead of sending complex directives and numerous memos, HQ sets up transfer
prices; instead of collecting numerous measures on the many dimensions of
performance, the head office looks at a single figure, the profits achieved by
the subsidiary, and rewards its manager accordingly.
The practical problems and limitations involved in setting up such
schemes provide a good illustration of the costs and benefits of price
controls and show why their use in firms is necessarily limited. To maximize
their income, managers will maximize the profits made by their units. In the
process, they will maximize the use of underpriced inputs or the generation of
underpriced outputs (of those whose price is below the opportunity cost to the
firm). For example, if the impact of the subunit ' s on the firm's reputation is
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not priced by HQ, and if subunit mangers are rewarded on the basis of the
annual profits made by the unit, then they can be expected to engage in
activities that maximize yearly profits at the expense of the firm's
reputation. All inputs and outputs used and produced by the profit center
(including intangibles such as reputation and experience) must therefore be
correctly priced to reflect their cost and benefit to the firm as a whole.
Our model shows that this is an impossible task. If all interactions
between the firm's subunits could be priced, then there would be no benefits
to intra-firm organization. Activities have been internalized within the firm
because market prices failed to organize at least one of the interdependences.
Because some inputs and outputs will not be priced correctly, managers will
suboptimize. Suboptimization is equivalent to cheating: it means that
employees will take advantage of the imperfection of the system used to
measure their output. To check the resulting generation of unwanted side
effects, and to encourage the production of desirable ones, HQ will add to the
transfer prices used to organize priceable interdependencies and hierarchical
constraints to organize the unpriceable ones. The subunit manager will be told
to maximize profits, but specific directives will be communicated concerning
ethical behavior, worker safety, pollution control, employee turnover, etc.
This constitutes a reintroduction of hierarchical constraints. There is a
limit to how far a firm can go in this direction. As more and more
hierarchical constraints are introduced, the advantages of profit centers will
be reduced. HQ will now have to send more directives to the subsidiary, and to
collect more information on compliance. Subsidiary managers will see their
autonomy decline, and their incentive to work hard and show initiative will be
24
correspondingly lowered. Both the informational simplicity and the motivating
virtues of profit centers will be lost. Shirking costs will rise with the
increase in behavior constraints.
3.3 Conclusion
We would expect the relationships between HQ and subsidiaries to be a mix
of the three control techniques described above, and to vary with HQ's
knowledge of the subunit's environment and the degree to which inter-
dependences between the parent and the subsidiary can be measured and con-
strained through prices. Non-priceable interdependencies organized through
price controls will lead to cheating ( suboptimization) . On the other hand,
imposing hierarchical constraints lowers the incentives that subsidiary
managers have to show initiative. The optimum control system should balance
those two sources of cost, shirking and cheating (suboptimization).
4. Some Observations on the Model
It may be worthwhile, at this stage, to compare the model developed above
with agency theory and with the way organization theory approaches the
problem. In contrast with some agency models (Eisenhardt, 1985), we do not
assume risk aversion on the part of the employee, and consequently do not
consider the risk-bearing consequences of control strategies. The model also
diverges from agency theory in specifying the cost of control as the sum of
the resources spent to impose a particular method of control plus the cost of
the unwanted side-effects that result from using this method.
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In contrast to organization theory, the model emphasizes the reward
aspects of control. This difference in emphasis is particularly important in
the case of "price control". The organization literature has generally
downplayed price control as defined here . Martinez and Jarillo (1989), for
example, review the organizational literature on control and list the eight
most common mechanisms of coordination used in firms. Price control, as
defined in this study, is not included. The authors mention output control,
which they define as "based on the evaluation of files, records, and reports
submitted to corporate management" and which they equate to "bureaucratic
control" (Child 1973). Output control is lumped with behavior control, and no
recognition is made of the fundamental difference between the two.
This is surprising, given the extensive use of price controls in firms.
About one-quarter of all workers in U.S. manufacturing industries in the mid-
703 (and 23 percent of all farm labor in 1959) were covered by some type of
incentive systems (Seiler, 1984). Incentive pay schemes are widespread at
upper levels: for example, bonuses made up 31 percent of the total
compensation received by executive VPs in 1986 (Reibstein, 1987). Price
control is also increasingly considered as a remedy for "bureaucratic
failures". The recent trend has been towards a development of these practices,
with the establishment of " intrapreneurship" schemes, and the recent move
towards commissions in department stores (Dunkin, 1989).
Although "output control" may seem similar to price control, there are
important but subtle differences between the two. Egelhoff (1988), in a very
thorough study of control mechanisms in MNEs, measures the extent of output
control by the frequency with which a number of performance measures (e.g.
26
sales to specific accounts or inventory levels) are received by HQ. This
concept differs significantly from "price controls". Although price controls
are output controls, since a price system rewards output, not all output
controls are price controls. Price controls establish a clear link between
rewards and output. They insure that the agent will not shirk and will use his
privileged knowledge to the employer's advantage. They are informationally
economical because they save the employer from having to collect extensive
information on the employee's production function. Output controls can differ
from price controls for two reasons. First, some organizations collect output
measures, but they have no direct influence on rewards, and hence on
motivations. Second, the term output control is sometimes applied to
intermediate outputs. Observing the values of many intermediate outputs comes
close to monitoring behavior. For example, when HQ asks a subsidiary manager
to report the level of salaries in the sales department, and it intervenes if
the overall wage bill is not reduced by 10 percent, this is tantamount to
telling him outright to cut the wage bill by 10 percent, which is straight
behavior control. The way organization theorists define output controls has
led some of them to consider behavior control and output control as
complements, while in our model (and in agency models) they are substitutes
(Eisenhardt, 1985 ). 12
One important limitation of the model developed in this chapter is the
lack of a time dimension. The model is implicitly a one period model. No
consideration is given to experience rating in firms and in markets. Yet
reputation effects can, in some cases, reduce cheating, while career ladders
can have a similar impact on shirking.
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5. Application to Multinational Firms
The three control techniques that we have described are used in varying
proportions by multinational enterprises (MNEs) to control their foreign
subsidiaries. Hierarchical control over subsidiaries is exercised through
visits from HQ personnel, written and oral directives sent to the subsidiary,
and requests for information. Socialization strategies have always played a
crucial role in MNEs. When communication costs were high, these strategies
were the only way to control far-flung subsidiaries. Family members were sent
abroad to manage the foreign business. Later, family members were replaced by
a small corps of trusted home-country managers (e.g. the "Dutch Mafia" at
Philips), who were then assigned to run the subsidiaries. Increasingly,
socialization is used to develop a corps of both home-country and foreign
country nationals (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1979). Bartlett and Goshal (1989,
ch. 10) document the efforts of some of the MNEs they studied (but especially
Unilever) to create such a cadre through extensive training and job rota-
13tions. Lastly, MNEs also often set up subsidiaries as profit centers and
reward their managers on the basis of the profits of their subunits.
5.1 Cost and Mix of Methods of Control for Foreign Subsidiaries
Extending our model to the MNE raises two main questions. First, how does
doing business across countries affect the level of organizing costs? Second,
how does it impact the mix of control mechanisms used?
There are reasons to believe that each of these three control modes will
be more costly to implement in an international than in a domestic setting.
Consequently, the lowest-cost mix of modes used to control foreign affiliates
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will be more costly than that used for domestic subunits.
Hierarchical control will be more expensive to implement in the case of
foreign than in the case of domestic subsidiaries. Geographical distance makes
it more difficult to observe behavior, since travel will be necessary. Second,
cultural differences make communication more costly: the need to be explicit
is greater, the chances of distortion increase with differences in languages.
Third, foreign environments are likely to be substantially different from
domestic ones; hence employees positioned in foreign countries have usually a
substantial information advantage over HQ, and central direction is more
likely to be inefficient. In fact, up until recently, the length of time it
took to refer to HQ and receive directives made centralization an extremely
costly proposition, and led MNEs to rely heavily on "on the spot" decisions.
Operating internationally also increases the cost of socialization. Doing
business abroad requires cross-cultural contact. That contact can take place
at various levels. The cultural homogeneity of the management corps can be
kept intact by sending expatriates to run the foreign subsidiary. Then the
cross-cultural interface is within the subsidiary, between the local labor
force and the expatriate manager. Or the local subsidiary may be run by local
managers, and then the cultural barrier must be bridged between HQ and
subsidiary managers. Using expatriate managers makes it possible to use
socialization strategies, but tends to damage relationships with local
suppliers, customers, and host country governments. Local employees may also
resent expatriates because they are usually paid more and because they limit
their advancement. Running the subsidiary with local managers, on the other
hand, will automatically raise the costs of socialization, as it dilutes the
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homogeneity of the group. In conclusion, imposing explicit or implicit
behavior constraints is more costly internationally than domestically.
The costs of using price constraints would seem to be less affected by
distance. As argued earlier, prices are very condensed signal, hence the cost
of communicating prices is not much greater across countries than within a
country. Ouchi's finding (1978) that measures of output are less subject to
distortion than measures of behavior when transmitted across hierarchical
levels, supports this view.
If we are right in our assumptions about the impact of internationaliza-
tion on the relative costs of imposing price and behavior constraints, then
interactions of a type that would be organized within firms in a domestic
context will be handled through the market (or not at all) when they involve
agents located in more than one country. As far as I know, there has been no
systematic empirical work testing this proposition. There is some evidence,
however, that the use of market processes to exploit knowledge (as opposed to
its internalization) is much more common internationally than domestically. In
their study of licensing contracts, Caves, Crookell, and Killing (1982) noted
that licensing was much more frequent internationally than domestically.
A second implication of our analysis is that the mix of techniques used
to control foreign subsidiaries should be more biased towards price control
than that used for domestic subsidiaries. One testable implication is that a
greater proportion of foreign than domestic subunits should be run as profits
centers.
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5.2 Centralization and Interdependencies
The explicit consideration of the full menu of methods of control used in
firms could help explain some of the conflicting results found in the study of
organization processes in MNEs. Consider first the study of centralization and
of its determinants. Centralization is one of the fundamental dimensions of
organization design. It is defined as the extent to which HQ makes decisions,
so it is eguivalent to what we have called hierarchical control. Organization
theorists have argued that the extent of interdependency among the subunits of
the organization is an important determinant of centralization (Van de Ven,
Delbecg and Koenig, 1976; Tushman and Nadler, 1978). According to Egelhoff
(1988, p. 131), interdependencies increase the need for information
processing. Centralizing decisions at HQ is one way to tackle this increased
information load, as "centralization provides coordination and integration
across the interdependency". Hence, Egelhoff hypothesizes that the extent of
centralization in MNEs should be correlated with the degree of interdependence
between the subsidiary and the rest of the organization.
Egelhoff tests this hypothesis by calculating the degree of
centralization of 22 decisions in three areas, marketing, manufacturing, and
finance, and correlating them with nine measures of interdependency. As shown
in Table 3, the results are mixed. Of the potential 27 correlations, only six
are significant at .05 (one-tailed test) and have the right sign.
The present study suggests some explanations for these results. Recall
that Egelhoff argues that efficiency reguires that all types of
31
interdependencies be organized through centralization of decision-making at HQ
(in our terminology hierarchical control). The model we have sketched
suggests, however, that not all interdependencies reguire coordination through
hierarchical control. Exercising behavior control from HQ reguires collecting
a tremendous amount of information on local conditions and on the extent to
which managers of foreign subsidiaries are following orders. If some
interdependencies can be mediated through prices, HQ will economize on the
need to gather information. All it needs is to specify appropriate transfer
prices, and let the subsidiary operate as a profit center. Centralization will
be low, even though control may remains high. Only interdependencies which are
not easily priced will be organized through direct behavior control. For
example, HQ is unlikely to determine operating decisions for the subsidiary
(such as how to price its products) unless it purchases these products from
the affiliate (there are interdependencies) and there are no market prices to
guide the transfers (interdependencies are not priceable). Dependencies that
are priceable include intracompany transfers of traded materials and of
standard technical knowledge. On the other hand, a subsidiary's use of a
parent's trademark or of its guarantee in borrowing funds is difficult to
price, and hence the parent will find it desirable to specify the guality
control procedures to be followed by the subsidiary and the uses to which
borrowed funds must be committed, i.e. HQ will control the behavior of the
subsidiary's manager.
Another factor weakens the connection between centralization and
interdependencies. As argued above, behavior control can be explicit
(hierarchical control) or implicit (socialization). An MNE faced with
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interdependencies which cannot be organized by prices need not resort to
hierarchical control (centralization) : it can instead socialize subsidiary
managers into making decisions that are similar to the ones that would be
taken by HQ. Hence the link between interdependencies and centralization
(hierarchical control) is not as direct as hypothesized by Egelhoff. Price
control and socialization can act as substitutes to centralization. This may
account for Egelhoff s results.
5.3 Autonomy of Affiliates
The present analysis also throws light on the concept of autonomy of
foreign affiliates. Autonomy is generally measured as the locus of decision-
making: if decisions are made at HQ, the subsidiary is said to have little
autonomy (Hedlund, 1981; Welge, 1987). The concept is clear, but its
interpretation is more ambiguous. Decisions made by a perfectly socialized
manager may be undistinguishable from those made at HQ. This will also be true
for an "autonomous" manager responding to a correctly specified system of
transfer prices. Autonomy measures the relative use of hierarchical control
(cell 1) as opposed to socialization and price control (cell 2 and 3). But it
does not necessarily reflect the subunit manager's degree of responsiveness to
local conditions and to the needs of local stakeholders.
5.4 Is Decentralization Desirable?
The explicit consideration of price controls in firms also suggests some
new ways of looking at modern management methods. Consider the following
parallel between profit centers and piece work schemes. Both have the same
goal: to motivate the employee to apply effort and initiative when output is
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relatively easy to measure and the employee has an information advantage over
management. Yet while decentralizing management to divisions (and to sub-
sidiaries) and rewarding their managers on the basis of their profits (setting
up a multidivisional structure) has generally been considered a major advance
in management (Chandler, 1966; Williamson, 1975; 1985), the piece rate system
has been seen in a very different light. Piece rate schemes have been said to
"absolve managers of the responsibility and costs of exploring, designing, and
supervising craft labor processes, which are typically complex and arcane"
(Brown and Philips, 1986). This was certainly the point of view of Taylor, and
the goal of Scientific Management was to replace price controls by behavior
controls. This required management to invest in knowing the worker's produc-
tion function (through time-and-motion studies, and the payoff was a sig-
nificant increase in productivity (Edwards, 1979). Couldn't then decentral-
ization, especially if it consists in having locals run the MNEs' foreign
subsidiaries, be also seen as a way to avoid learning how to operate in
foreign countries, as a way to avoid management? If so, the recent decline in
the use of expatriates by US MNEs, a decline which seems to be due to the
inability of U.S. managers and of their families to adapt to conditions abroad
(Kobrin, 1988), bodes ill for the ability and the willingness of American MNEs
to compete in increasingly global industries.
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Table 1
Employee Control modes used in firms
cheating costs/
shirking costs
Management knowledge of the worker's
production function
higher
than workers
lower
than workers
high cheating
low shirking
low cheating
high shirking
1. hierarchy
4. no interaction
within the firm
2. selection and/or
socialization
3. price control
(e.g. piece work)
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Table 2
Subunit Control modes used in firms
cheating costs/
shirking costs
Headquarter ' s knowledge of the unit
production function
higher lower
than local management than local management
high cheating
low shirking
1. hierarchy
"centralization"
2. selection and/or
socialization
low cheating
high shirking
4. no interaction
within the firm
3. profit centers
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Table 3
Correlations between Centralization Scales
and Strategic and Environmental Conditions
Subsidiary-Level Conditions Centralization in
Marketing Manufacturing Finance
marketing information dependence .21* .24* .10
new manufacturing .01 .14 -.19
information dependency
day to day manufacturing .11 .15 -.06
information dependency
new product design dependency -.10 .16 -.25**
product design change dependency .10 .27**
intracompany purchases by subsidiary .08 .14 -.24*
intracompany sales by subsidiary .27** -.01 .24*
sales dependence .11 .03 .19*
size of subsidiary .19 -.19
(sub size/parent size)
Source: Egelhoff, 1988, Table 7-2
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Notes
1. If one assumes some degree of competition, one can expect the
most efficient mode to dominate the less efficient one, and thus
the mode actually chosen to organize the transaction should match
that predicted by this theory. The model is thus applicable to
those cases where institutions are not sheltered from competition
by collusion or government intervention. It has, therefore,
greater applicability in competitive industries than in
government bureaus.
2. Note that they do it "in complete disregard of the decision of
others, or even the existence of others" (Demsetz, 1988). This is
because prices reflect perfectly the social conseguences of each
agent's actions.
3. Indeed, in some firms they may be punished for doing bearing
bad news.
4. To simplify the exposition I am abstracting here from
reputation effects. With bounded rationality, the probability of
losing reputation due to dishonest behavior will never be 1, and
can in fact be remarkably low. In some cases, however, reputation
effects may be high enough to discourage dishonesty.
5. In our example, they will underuse' effort in applying
fertilizer because effort reduces their utility.
6. For a fascinating case study, see Brown and Philips (1986).
7. We are considering here strategies if control within the firm.
An alternative strategy is, of course, to subcontract the
activity (to let it be organized through the price system)
.
8. Clark (1984) guotes the results of a number of studies compar-
ing the hourly rates of pieceworkers vs. time workers in a number
of occupations. Pieceworkers earned between 13 and 25 percent
more than time workers. This cannot be due to self-selection,
since firms using time rates have the possibility to fire least-
efficient workers and to keep the most efficient ones.
9. A typical example of this is the recent case of an IRS
employee who received bonuses linked to the percentage of tax-
payer's gueries answered. He maximized it by systematically
throwing out any query left unanswered by evaluation time. In
terms of our model, the externalities generated by failing to
constrain all aspects of behavior were probably greater than the
reduction in shirking due to the use of market processes.
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10. Intertemporal suboptimization is also a problem. Subsidiaries
are not free-standing entities, and are not generally quoted on
local stock markets. There is therefore no easy way to evaluate
the impact of the subsidiary manager's present decisions on the
subsidiary's future profit stream. If the manager is rewarded on
the basis of annual profits, he can be expected to maximize
present income at the expense of future profits by a variety of
stratagems, such as cutting R&D budgets, or cutting employment
and jeopardizing long-term government relations.
11. An exception is the work of Ouchi (1979, 1981). Ouchi pointed
out that firms could either monitor the performance of their
employees on the basis of behavior or on that of output. His
explanation of the choice between these two modes is, however,
different from the one used here. For him, "a bureaucratic form
of organization succeeds because it replaces complete forms of
contracting with a single incomplete contract, which is the
employment contract" (Ouchi, 1981, p. 416). He does not make the
link between shirking and cheating (see for example 1979, p.
836) .
12. Eisenhardt (1985) found commission payments and straight
salary to be substitute forms of compensating salesclerks.
13. Sometimes socialization is extended to the whole labor force.
For example, Nissan spent $63 million to send 383 employees of
its U.S. assembly plant to see its Japanese operations and be
indoctrinated in the company "way of doing things"
14. Differences in tax rates between countries may make it
advantageous to use transfer prices which differ from arm's
length prices. As a result, a subsidiary's reported profits may
diverge from its real profits. Rewarding managers on the basis of
these reported profits will have strong disincentive effects. One
solution is to keep two sets of books, one for the tax
authorities, and the other to judge the profitability of the
subsidiaries and to reward their managers. The latter record the
profits obtained by using unbiased transfer prices (Brooke and
Remmers, 1970)
.
15. See also Taylor and Silberston (1973, ch. 7).
16. Egelhoff finds a significantly positive correlation between
output control and centralization, and no significant correlation
between the extent to which subsidiaries are staffed with
expatriates and both centralization and output control. The first
set of results may be explained by the way output control is
measured. The second set of findings may come from the difficulty
of keeping the desired level of control constant when observing
the mix of methods used to control foreign subsidiaries.
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